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ния) между религиозным ученым, богословом и историком Шихабад-
дином Марджани (1818–1889) и его оппонентами рассматривается 
полемика как механизм поиска и утверждения истины. Выступая 
в качестве одного из возможных ответов татар-мусульман на им-
перский вызов, религиозная полемика анализируется в свете из-
менившихся политических, экономических и социальных условий 
Нового времени, когда через теологические дискуссии о каламе и бо-
жественных атрибутах очерчивались новые границы религиозной 
традиции и одновременно пересматривалась окружающая действи-
тельность в свете первоисточников.
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P olemic and discussions in which the antique philosophers and Muslim, Christian and Jewish scholastic theologians were engaged have recently attracted the attention of historians, philologists and researchers of religion. An interesting overview of the 
polemic was made in the study by Sidney Griffit, who showed how the literature genre of 
apologetic Christian works in the Arabic language was developed through the social institution 
of Majlises, serving as venues for disputes and discussions (Griffith, 1999). Sarah Stroumsa 
considered the role of bad manners in the medieval disputes and highlighted that Majlises 
discussed topical and burning issues inseparable from the surrounding reality (Stroumsa, 
1999, p. 66). In the discussions of Iberian Muslims, Gerard Wiegers saw “polemic transfers,” 
influencing the Northern Europe of the 17th century through transnational scholarly and 
religious networks. The said author also noted that polemic texts created the necessary tools 
* This paper is a partially reworked English version of an article by Dinara Z. Mardanova, “Controversy as a mechanism for 
search and approval of truth (the case of debate on ‘aqidah between Shihabaddin Mardjani and his opponents in the 
Volga region in the last third of the 19th century),” published in Russian for RUDN Journal of Russian History.
** The work was supported by the research grant of the “Ibn Sina Islamic Culture Research Foundation”: Ibn Sina Grant 
No 2ИСГ/2018.
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for religious discussions between Jews, Christians, and Muslims (Wiegers, 2016). In the above 
works, polemic was often analyzed in the light of interaction and mutual influence of the 
three Abrahamic religions — Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. At a conference at Cordoba 
(12-14 April 2018), acute interest was caused by the intra-Islamic polemic as an example of 
intra-confession polemic within a single discourse area1. The author of the present article 
examined the problem of Ijtihād and Taqlīd through the debates of Tatar ’ulama’ concerning 
the reform of Muslim law in the section of worship (‘ibādah) (Mardanova, 2017).
To continue the theme of polemic, I suggest considering polemic as a mechanism for 
searching for and establishing the truth (by the example of polemic on the issues of ‘aqidah 
between Sh. Mardjani and his opponents). Within the framework of this problem the 
following issues are discussed: 1) the polemical genre in the Islamic world and Majlis as a 
forum for discussions and debates of Muslims in solving topical issues of the intellectual, 
religious and social character; 2) the reformation of Islam in the late 19th century among 
Muslims of the Russian Empire; 3) the discussion of the image of the “true” creed (‘aqidah) 
through dogmatic discussions about the kalam, mutakallims, the doctrine of the divine 
attributes; 4) the boundaries of the sources of authority and forbidden innovations (bid‘at); 
5) the return to “uprightness” through a renewal (tajdid), which supposed, on the one hand, 
the introduction to the tradition of “necessary” and “true” conceptions, and on the other 
hand, the rejection of the “irrelevant,” that is, allegedly, “untrue” views; 6) the criticism of 
Mardjani as a legitimate participant in the dispute, the innovator of Islam (mujaddid) and a 
theologian and jurist capable of ĳtihad (mujtahid). Such perspective will make it possible to 
trace how the Muslim scholars of the Volga region adapted the religious doctrine to the social 
realities of the Russian Empire, against the background of decreased prestige of Bukhara 
among the Muslims of the Volga-Ural region and the Muslims’ gradual reorientation from 
Central Asia to the Russian Empire (Frank, 2012).
POLEMIC AMONG MUSLIMS 
T he genre of polemic has a long and rich history. Scholastic disputes were common in medieval intellectual life, being inherited by the Islamic, Jewish and Christian world from the antique philosophical practice (Novikoff, 2013). Traditionally, the venues for 
discussions and disputes of the Muslims were Majlises, where the intellectual and religious 
issues were discussed. Descriptions of such “literature” salons are frequent in the Arabic 
medieval sources (Stroumsa, 1999, pp. 66-67). Majlises were attended by rulers; thinkers, 
poets and other learned people used them to submit their skills to the approval of the public. 
For example, at the court of al-Maʾmūn assemblies were held that served as sites for free 
discussions for the spiritual leaders of various religious schools, including the Christians, 
the Zoroastrians and the Manicheans. al-Maʾmūn considered such discussions and scholarly 
disputes to be a reliable means of searching for the truth. Books were composed based on the 
results of scholarly discussions and disputes (Shagaviev, 2010, p. 23). A popular pastime was 
debates of two or more participants on religious and philosophical topics. Often, the debates 
went beyond the framework of mere entertainment, turning into heated discussions, verbal 
jousts or even conflicts (Stroumsa, 1999, p. 66). With the lapse of time, certain rules and types 
of behavior were elaborated to prevent conflict situations. As noted by Stroumsa, the behavior 
etiquette of the mediaeval Majlises was inspired by the ethics of a dispute. For theologians, the 
1. Patricia Crone Memorial Conference “The Majlis revisited: Inter- and intra-religious and cross-cultural disputations in 
the Islamicate world” 12-14 April 2018, Casa Árabe. Cordoba, 2018.
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main criterion was the truth; thus, correct behavior was the criterion for measuring the debates’ 
efficiency as the way to achieve the truth (Stroumsa, 1999, p. 82). A dispute was considered 
legitimate and acceptable when the aim of the participants was the joint search for the truth. A 
dispute was considered forbidden if the aim was to ruin an opponent by revealing his mistakes 
or to establish one’s own point of view. In that case, the rules of acceptable dispute were 
violated, and the discussion turned into forbidden debate leading to discord. Thus, dispute or 
polemic could both lead to establishing the truth and become the reason for deep doubt and 
dissention2. As Stroumsa noted, religious and theological disputes were inseparable from their 
environment, as they touched upon topical and burning issues. In particular, the first Muslim 
theologians, the Mu‘tazilites  at the court of Caliph al-Maʾmūn, defended the provisions of 
Islam and responded to various insinuations about it on the part of the Christians, the Jews 
and the Zoroastrians; at the same time, at an ideological level the Mu‘tazilites  struggled against 
various movements within Islam, which professed such doctrines as the incarnation of God, 
transmigration of souls, etc. That is, through polemic in disputes and dialectic discourses/
discussions3 the Muslim theologians, using logic, logical regularities and strong inferences, 
could, on the one hand, disprove and reject an erroneous opinion, and on the other hand, 
reveal and establish the “truth” most suitable for the given historical conditions. It should be 
noted that not all scholars agreed with such a theological conception of reaching the truth. In 
particular, Al-Hallaj and Ibn al-Rawandi opposed such a system of debates. They considered 
the established code of rules of debate to be a novelty of theologians aimed at reaching their 
own goals, when Majlises served as a tool for establishing ideas rather than an arena for the 
free exchange of ideas. That is why both scholars deprecated theologians and their claims for 
monopolizing the truth (Stroumsa, 1999, p. 82).
Traditionally, disputes at Majlises became a vehicle for discussing theological issues for 
mutakallimun (i.e., the Muslim theologians and specialists in dogmatic theology, including the 
Mu‘tazilites , the Ash‘arites, and the Maturidites). The dogmatic theology per se was dubbed 
ʿilm al-kalām, or kalam in short. In connection with the subject matter of kalam, related to 
the issues of unity of Allah and the principle of monotheism, kalam was called the doctrine 
of tawḥīd and attributes of Allah. The limited evidence, used by all Muslims, consisted of 
the words of shahadah. Beyond them, theological and political dissentions began, developing 
around a certain range of topics: the definition of a faithful Muslim, the nature of the Quran, 
the character of divine attributes and comprehension of their limits, predestination and the 
freedom of will, anthropomorphism, eschatological issues, the status of prophecy, etc.
THE REFORM (AL-ISLAH) AND THE MUSLIMS OF THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE
A t the end of the 19th — beginning of the 20th century, ideas of reforming Islam spread among Muslim scholars all over the world. The catalyst was the challenge launched against the Muslim world by European modernism, which caused a conceptual crisis in Muslim 
society. The idea of reforming appeared in the works by Russian Muslims in the 18th century, 
then developed in the 19th — beginning of the 20th century4. In the 19th century, when wealthy 
trading and industrial Muslim bourgeoisie appeared in the Volga-Ural region, the critique of 
authorities and society became a determinative element in the works by many Muslim authors. 
Most of the scholars took up a protective position in relation to Islam, calling for wariness of the 
2. See Faukiya (1979) for more detail. 
3. According to encyclopedias, dialectics is the art of holding a conversation, a dispute.
4. See Yuzeev (2012); Kemper (2008).
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novelties coming from the Russians. Alongside the outward critique of the Russian government 
and elites, there was extensive inward critique aimed at the Muslim community, which resulted 
in revealing numerous disputable issues. The Muslim scholars proposed new interpretations 
and ways of reading the texts, which would comply with the requirements of the epoch; that is, 
legitimation of the contemporary epoch took place through texts. The reformers were interested 
both in the issues of everyday life and theological themes. One of the key reasons for “decline” 
and loss of the past grandeur was connected with the deviation from the true religious doctrine 
(‘aqidah) as a result of infusion of forbidden novelties (bid‘at).
The most consistent critic of the surrounding reality at that time was a religious scholar, 
theologian and historian, Shihabaddin Mardjani, who, according to one of the first researchers 
of his works, K. Tarjemani, “substantiated the issues of faith […] with religious proofs from the 
sacred texts (naql), purified them from the novelties based on philosophical views and from 
the mazhab fanaticism, and returned the Muslims to pure faith, which the Muslims had been 
taught by the Prophet” (Shihabaddin Mardjani, 2015, p. 164).
As early as during his studies in Central Asia (1838-1849), Mardjani started to think that 
his contemporaries deviated from true Islam and were living in the epoch of decline. He 
associated the blessed time, or the “golden age,” of Islam with the epoch of Prophet Muhammad 
and his companions (sahabah), and he traced deviation from the truth to the time after the 
third generation, when the forbidden novelties (bid‘at) (Mardjani, 1870, p. 84), lies, slander 
and like “nonsense” (hazayan) were introduced into the section of worship (‘ibadah) and the 
section of dogmas or doctrine (‘aqidah) (Mardjani, 1870, p. 108).
In many works, Mardjani touches upon the issues of doctrine (‘aqidah). In the present 
paper, the sources of Mardjani’s ideas on dogmatic issues are the following works: “al-
Hikma al-Baliga” [“Mature wisdom”], published in Kazan in 1889 (in it Mardjani criticized 
the then popular comment by al-Taftazani to “ ‘Aqidah al-Nasafi”); the treatise “Nazurat al-
haqq” [“Review of the truth”], published in Kazan in 1870; and “Wafiyat al-aslaf ” [“About the 
predecessors in more detail”], published in Kazan in 1883. Not all Mardjani’s contemporaries 
agreed with his “reformatory” proposals in the section of doctrine (‘aqidah). There was a large 
group of scholars who criticized Mardjani’s views.
The most well-known critical response to “Nazurat al-haqq” was a work by Gabdullah 
al-Nasavi “al-Djaruda” [“Denunciation of “Nazurat al-haqq”], published in the typography 
of Kazan University in 1874. Alongside with al-Nasavi, who defended the local tradition, 
Mardjani was criticized by Abu Nakib al-Tuntari — Mardjani’s main ideological opponent, 
also known as Ishmi Ishan; Mukhammad al-Shaulyankari, who got the “traditional Muslim 
education by classical books” in Ishmi Ishan’s madrasah (al-Shaulankari, 1901a, p. 66); and 
Dinmuhammad ibn Yarmuhammad ibn Mansur al-Tuntari.
SECTION OF DOCTRINE (‘AQIDAH)
T he domain of dogmatics, alongside with the genre of corresponding works (declaring the religious-legal “credo” of a scholar), is called ‘aqidah (i.e., faith or conviction). As the main sources of Islam — the Quran and the Sunnah — contain no formal text of 
creed (‘aqidah) (they just outline the basic borders of the Muslim doctrine), several texts of 
creed were formed, accompanied by comments and subcomments. In the Volga region, fol-
lowing the Central Asian tradition, the text ‘Aqidah al-Nasafi was widely spread, together 
with comment by al-Taftazani. In the opinion of Zeki Velidi, this text was “the most popular 
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work in the Muslim, including the Tatar, madrasahs” of that time (Validov, 1923, p. 105). Ac-
cording to Damir Shagaviyev, it is this text that facilitated the popularity of the Maturidi 
school of kalam, which most of the Volga region Muslims adhered to (Mardjani, 2008, p. 93). 
In dogmatic issues, Maturidism occupied the intermediate position between tradition (naql) 
and reason (‘aql). “Maturidi rationally substantiated the fundamental issues of faith, without 
ignoring the apparent religious texts at the same time.” Interpretation of the texts was based 
on reason. For Maturidi followers, reason and tradition were similar paths leading a person 
to the same goal; there was no contradiction and opposition between them (Muhametshin, 
Adygamov, 2016, pp. 146-147). According to the Maturidi school, to achieve the true and 
indestructible faith in (‘aqidah) issues, a Muslim was barred from blind imitation without 
comprehending by reason (taqlīd), that is why the doctrine based on the Quran and the Sun-
nah was corroborated with rational proofs. 
Mardjani associated the causes of the Islamic world’s decline with the forbidden novel-
ties introduced into the section of worship (‘ibadah) and the section of dogmas or doc-
trine (‘aqidah). He associates novelties in the sphere of doctrine with the representatives 
of speculative theology — mutakallimun in the epoch of Caliph al-Maʾmūn (September 
786 — August 833) (Mardjani, 1870, p. 387), who, according to Mardjani, brought “a weak 
imaginary way, on which there is only longing and caprice” (Mardjani, 1870, p. 84). Fur-
ther, Mardjani gives several examples of authoritative scholars of the past criticizing kalam, 
including Ibn Malik, Abu Khanifa, Abu Yusuf, Ahmad ibn Hanbal, and Imam al-Shafi‘i. 
According to Mardjani, all of them criticized kalam, considering it to a forbidden novelty 
(bid‘at), which did not exist under the Prophet Muhammad and which led the Muslims to 
ruin (Mardjani, 2008, pp. 132-133). 
According to Mardjani, kalam was invented by the Mu‘tazilites , who borrowed philoso-
phers’ methodology from Arabic translations of Greek philosophic works. Having borrowed 
the philosophical methodology, the Mu‘tazilites  started to search for philosophical substan-
tiation of the Islamic doctrine (‘aqidah). As a result, according to Mardjani, the Islamic doc-
trine based on the proofs from the Quran and the Sunnah was supplemented with philo-
sophical aims and proofs. From the Mu‘tazilites , kalam was inherited by the Ash‘arites, and 
with the lapse of time kalam turned into an independent branch of learning. The initial ‘aqi-
dah appeared to be indistinguishable from philosophical theories; the people who rejected 
kalam were blamed of unbelief. While philosophical views penetrated into the section of 
‘aqidah, scholars started to argue about and dispute the correct doctrine (Shihabaddin Mard-
jani, 2015, p. 162, p. 335). Further, kalam spread and gained popularity due to later authors 
who “… concluded that it was permissible to study kalam and to read books about it, as it was 
necessary to protect the Muslim dogmas against their merging with novelties.”
As for Mardjani’s opponents (al-Nasavi, al-Kazani, Dinmuhammed and al-Shaulyankari), 
they, on the contrary, defended kalam, considering Mardjani’s ideas to be a deviation from 
the true ‘aqidah and the introduction of the forbidden novelties into it (al-Tuntari, Encour-
aging, p. 3; al-Shaulankari, 1901b, p. 63). For example, al-Nasavi wrote that Mardjani did 
not follow the way of true ‘aqidah and that “all human connections built by this person are 
wrong. The only true way is correspondence of words and deeds to the Prophet’s Sunnah.” 
Mardjani’s opponents asserted that their way was correct because it corresponded to the 
Prophet’s ‘aqidah, while the way of their rivals was wrong (al-Nasavi, 1874, p. 18). “Although 
they call themselves ahl al-Sunnah and al-jamāʿ, they actually belong to a deluded sect…,” al-
Shaulankari wrote (al-Shaulankari, 1901a, p. 12).
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Mullah al-Nasavi criticized Mardjani and argued for kalam. He asserted that studying 
kalam, if it does not lead to delusion, is not only permitted but, moreover — “ayats and 
Hadith command us to study kalam,” as “kalam does not lead to unbelief ” (al-Nasavi, 1874, 
pp. 20-21) but “is a means which makes it possible to rid oneself from following the ancestors’ 
religion blindly (taqlīd — D.M.) and leads to faith” (al-Nasavi, 1874, p. 17). The author of 
“Djaruda” gave multiple reasons for the need to cognize Allah by means of kalam. al-Nasavi 
wrote that “the learning of the fundamentals of religion is actually kalam, which seeks for 
Allah on the basis of cause-and-effect relations…. Kalam is one of the most authoritative 
scholarships of Shariah.” Moreover, kalam is necessary in cognizing the essence of divinity, as 
it “… helps a person to ascend from the level of taqlīd to the level of complete confidence (in 
the existence of Allah).” A Muslim rejecting kalam “… did not cognize Allah through reasons. 
A person adhering to taqlīd in the issues of ‘aqidah is a sinner”; as “in the issues of ‘aqidah 
taqlīd is forbidden, each person must cognize Allah and His existence independently, even 
though in general terms” (al-Nasavi, 1874, p. 16; p. 8).
Criticizing kalam, Mardjani, nevertheless, uses the methods of the mutakallims (i.e., he 
follows kalam). The opponents repeatedly reproach him for that (al-Nasavi, 1874, p. 20; 
p. 22). Moreover, Mardjani repeatedly called himself a follower of the school of Maturidi 
(Mardjani, 2008), who was a mutakallim. Thus, one may suppose that Mardjani criticized not 
the whole kalam but certain sections of it. As Mardjani asserted, the mutakallims introduced 
novelties into the following sections of the doctrine: tawḥīd (the attributes and names of 
Allah), beginning and eternity of the Universe, prophecy and miracles, defining the group 
of the saved, and the issue of the Quran’s creation (Shihabaddin Mardjani, 2015, p. 165). The 
largest discussions and polemics were caused by Mardjani’s views on the divine attributes and 
names, thus we will consider this aspect as an example.
POLEMIC AROUND DIVINE ATTRIBUTES
M ardjani wrote: “We [the Hanafites] interpret the attributes as nothing else but the names. They are confirmed by indubitable proofs, tradition and reason” (Mardjani, 2008, pp. 180-181). Describing the attributes, he cited Sheikh al-’Arif Abu Talib al-
Makki: “We get information about the attributes from reliable tradition, which transfer is 
correct. We do not accept this (the attributes — D.M.) and do not confirm through judging 
by analogy (qiyas) and reason (‘aql). But we believe in the names and attributes by their 
meanings and essences, belonging to Allah the Almighty. We reject similarity and conferring 
any form to them (the attributes), as there is nothing adequate to the above to be similar to 
that, and there is no equivalent to that to be of the same kind with that” (Mardjani, 2008, 
p. 170). Further: “A duty of everyone in this section [of the doctrine] is to stand by the 
explanations of a legislator; and to adhere firmly to his borders in describing His qualities 
and His names, and not to describe Him through Himself [not to derive one quality from 
others], and to call Him the sent down in His book [the Quran]” (Mardjani, 1870, p. 81). Here, 
Mardjani differs from Qursawi, who admitted that “from the God’s names given in the Quran, 
one can derive the abstract ones, even if they are not directly mentioned in the sacred texts” 
(Kemper, 2008, p. 355). Thus, according to Michael Kemper, Mardjani excluded from ‘aqidah 
the discussions about the properties of matter, bodies and accidents, inherent in classical 
Maturidi and Ash‘ari traditions of kalam (Kemper, 2008, p. 592).
In the opinion of Mardjani, the “position of ‘aqidah is simple. Its domain is based on two 
ayats: Said the Almighty: ‘Allah has beautiful names; called Him by them…’ (Quran 7:180); Said 
the Almighty: ‘… there is nothing similar to Him. He is the hearing, the seeing!’ ” (Quran 42:11). 
DINARA MARDANOVA
131
On the issue of the attributes, Mardjani argued both with the Mu‘tazilites and the 
Ash‘arites. He criticized the Mu‘tazilites  for asserting the absence of the divine attributes 
and the later Ash‘arites for dividing the attributes into two types — the attributes of essence 
(ḏāt)5 and the attributes of action (fi‘liy)6. Ash‘arites consider the attributes of essence to be 
eternal, while the attributes of action (i.e., creation) are wrong according to Mardjani: “Allah 
the Almighty with all His attributes and names is eternal and non inchoate; the attributes of 
Allah the Almighty and His names are not Himself and are not anything other than Himself 
(lā huwa wa-lā ġayruhu)” (Mardjani, 2008, p. 196)7. 
Thus, Mardjani admitted only the attributes and names described in the Quran and the 
Sunnah, while any other attempts to dwell upon the essence of Allah he ascribed to the rea-
soning of the mutakallimun and considered them to be imported and unacceptable novel-
ties (Mardjani, 2008, pp. 176-177). He wrote: “Have not you heard His words: ‘Reason about 
the benefactions of Allah the Almighty, but do not reason about Allah the Almighty!,’ ‘Rea-
son about creations, but do not reason about the Creator, as, indeed, His degree is incom-
prehensible for you’ ” (Mardjani, 2008, p. 185). Mardjani asserted that a human is not ca-
pable of cognizing the essence of Allah with rational means: “…Debar it [the mind — Damir 
Shagaviyev] from researching the identity and essences of the God’s attributes” (Mardjani, 
2008, p. 380). 
From such ideas of Mardjani, his refusal to use reason for cognizing Allah, al-Nasavi de-
rived, first, a contradiction to “the unanimous opinion of scholars [ĳmāʿ − D.M.] about the 
need to cognize Allah with auxiliary means [the mind]” (Mardjani, 2008, p. 185) and, second, 
to the unethical attitude of “such scholars as Imam al-Ash‘ari and his disciples” (al-Nasavi, 
1874, p. 13). In the opinion of al-Nasavi, all great scholars practiced kalam: Abu Hanifa, his 
disciples, Abu Mansur al-Maturidi, Sheikh Abu Khasan al-’ashari, Imam al-Gazali, Fahr ar-
Razi (al-Nasavi, 1874, p. 15), Ibn al-Khumam (al-Nasavi, 1874, pp. 8-10), etc. Consequently, 
for al-Nasavi cognizing Allah and His attributes through reason was an obligatory and neces-
sary requirement for a believer. He wrote: “One of the most important and primary duties of 
a believer is cognizing Allah, His names and attributes” (al-Nasavi, 1874, p. 16).
Another opponent of Mardjani — Damullah Dinmuhammed — advocated the divine at-
tributes not mentioned in the Quran. He wrote: “… He [Allah] has eternal qualities indispens-
able from His Image” (al-Tuntari, Encouraging, p. 13). According to Dinmuhammed, Mardjani 
rejected these qualities because he did not understand the words of honorable scholars. He 
noted: “Our teacher, speaking of using the above qualities of Allah, implied their special men-
tioning in the Quran and the Sunnah. That is why, the word al-Qayum (Allah’s epithet “Eter-
nally existing”, “the Existing” − D.M.) always follows the word al-Hay (Allah’s epithet “Eternally 
living” — D.M.)” (al-Tuntari, 1909, p. 20). Dinmuhammed thought that Allah possesses “the 
right of His essence in respect of His eternal indispensable qualities. al-Hamd [“the Glorified”] 
is among the qualities of His essence…” (al-Tuntari, 1909, p. 31).
Although Mardjani listed himself as a follower of Maturidi and repeatedly cited his works, 
his doctrine of God’s attributes partly differed from Maturidism. According to research by 
5. al-Taftazani was criticized for the same reason; he separated the attributes of essence too much, thus challenging the unity 
of God.
6. “The eastern Hanafites rejected the difference between the eternal attributes of essence and the temporal attributes of 
action. For them, the attributes of action, which they usually united into a single notion ‘bringing to existence’ (takwin), 
were equally eternal and existed within the essence of God; however, His attribute of ‘bringing to existence’ differed 
from ‘what was raised.’ ” See: Attributes of God…
7. See more about lā huwa wa-lā ġayruhu in (Spannaus, 2015).
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W. Rudolph on Maturidi kalam in Samarkand, Maturidi “advocated the need to use speculative 
conclusions (nathar) in theology” (Rudolph, p. 157), explaining that “the existence of divine 
attributes is conveyed to us both through tradition and through reason” (Rudolph, p. 221). 
In the book at-Tawḥīd, al-Maturidi dwelled upon kalamic issues, such as God sitting on the 
throne (Rudolph, p. 154); that is, he did not limit the description of God by tradition (naql) 
only, admitting the possibility to cognize Allah through reason (‘aql). 
Thus, as was noted by I. Marash, Mardjani criticized not kalam per se, but penetration of 
kalamic methods into tawḥīd. “Mardjani draws a borderline between kalam and tawḥīd”; that 
is, he draws new borderlines of the Muslim dogmatics (Marash, 2005, pp. 75-76).
SOURCES OF TAWḥīD
F or Mardjani’s opponents, the sources of belief in Allah and its main arguments were the Quran, Sunnah, consensus (ĳmaʿ) and reason (‘aql). Unlike his opponents, Mardjani admitted only what was granted in the Quran and Sunnah, rejecting the possibility of 
rational interpretation of Allah’s attributes and allegoric interpretation of the Quran (ta’wil). 
In Mardjani’s ‘aqidah, “blind faith” or following the tradition (naql) appeared in the place of 
intelligence (‘aql). Mardjani asserted that the only sources of tawḥīd were the Quran’s ayats 
from the category of categorical (qati‘ ya) (Mardjani, 2008, p. 94); that is, one must not use 
in tawḥīd statements from the category of suppositional (zanniyya), obtained through ĳtihad 
or opinion (rа’i). A believer should not doubt anything stated in the asserted ayats and the 
Hadises and should recognize them as actually true. If that truth is not comprehensible to 
them, then they should not try to find it (Mardjani, 2008, p. 83). Tawḥīd does not contain any 
deep concepts to be comprehended by intelligence, and an attempt to “immerse” oneself in 
tawḥīd with the help of reasonable arguments leads to a pernicious mistake and, ultimately, to 
atheism (Mardjani, 2008, p. 82). The Mardjani’s opponents considered such interpretation of 
sources to be sinful and saw a forbidden novelty in it, contradicting the unanimous opinion 
of the scholars (ĳmaʿ) about the necessity to cognate Allah through intelligence.
The demand to follow only the reliable proofs in tawḥīd is related to Mardjani’s idea that 
a mistake is inadmissible in the fundamentals of faith (usul al-din), including tawḥīd; thus, 
qiyas aqliy is inadmissible, because it is based on human intelligence and not protected against 
being a mistake. According to Mardjani, the one who is mistaken in usul al-din differs from 
the one who is mistaken in the fundamentals of fikh (usul al-fikh). If a mujtahid is mistaken 
in usul al-fikh, for example, in the issues of worship (‘ibadah), he will not be punished but 
will receive a reward to a certain extent. If a mujtahid is mistaken in usul al-din, he does not 
receive a reward but commits a sin, hence, will be punished (Mardjani, 2008, p. 83).
TAKFIR OF THE “GREAT SCHOLARS” IS THE FORBIDDEN (BID‘AH)
T he opponents were most of all bewildered to see Mardjani using the ayats usually applied to the infidels (kafirun) to criticize “the great scholars.” For example, al-Shaulyankari wrote: “Deriding ahl al-Sunna wa al-jama[‘], they read the following ayats of the Quran: 
‘and leave those who practice deviation concerning His names’ (7:180), and the ayat: ‘those 
whose effort is lost in worldly life, while they think that they are doing well in work’ (18:104). 
Also: ‘And if you obey most of those upon the earth, they will mislead you from the way of 
Allah’ (6:116)... These ayats speak of the infidels, while they read them about those who admit 
additional qualities, who believe in a temporary origin of the world, who believe in un-eternity 
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of this world, and in resurrection from the dead. Reproaching these people, threatening them[,] 
you accuse the imams of Shariah in delusion” (al-Shaulankari, 1901a, p. 10).
According to al-Nasavi, accusations of unbelief addressed by Mardjani to scholars are 
forbidden (bid‘ah). al-Nasavi wrote: “Know that dispute among scholars goes on since olden 
times, but no one of them dared to accuse his opponents in delusion, and this adventurer was 
the first one to do it” (al-Nasavi, 1874, p. 5).
“Admonition of opponents is a novelty, and such person is a mubtadi[‘].” A similar opinion 
on prohibition of accusing “the great scholars” of unbelief was expressed by al-Shaunkari: 
“Accusing the leaders of the Islamic Ummah of unbelief is unbelief ” (al-Shaulankari, 1901a, 
p. 12). In a similar way, the opponents proved Mardjani’s inconsistency as a legitimate debater 
whose aim was to find the truth.
As for Mardjani, he actually called certain actions of people “unbelief ” (kufr), like 
rejecting ĳtihad, but I never see statements where Mardjani called the people “infidels” 
(kafir). In regard to unbelief, Mardjani wrote that the one who rejects the broadly recognized 
consensus (ĳmaʿ mutawatir), such as the five Pillars of Islam, “is accused of unbelief for the 
reason of denying that,” because these regulations were directly listed by Allah and belong to 
the categorical precepts (qati‘ya). Mardjani wrote that the one rejecting the obligatory (fard) 
or the due (wajib), established by ĳmaʿ qati‘ya, commits kufr (Mardjani, 2008, pp. 341-345).
Thus, Mardjani’s opponents believed that Mardjani, criticizing the opinions of “the great 
scholars” and conceptions of the past centuries, resorts to a very serious accusation in Islam; 
that is, the accusation of unbelief (kufr), which could be followed by death in the past centuries 
of Islam. Polemics around various aspects of apostasy (kufr) had a great significance in Islam 
for forming political conceptions and served as a background for developing important 
dogmatic and legal issues (Dictionary, 1991, p. 145).
RETURNING TO THE “STRAIGHT WAY” THROUGH TAJDID
W hile rejection of the forbidden and excluding it from the tradition was carried out by consigning it to the forbidden novelties (bid‘at), Mardjani and other reformers believed that returning to the “straight way” should be carried out through reforming. 
The correction (islah) of Islam should be done “… by ‘renovation’ (tajdid), through refusing 
to follow traditions (taqlid), confirming the ‘unlawful novelties’ (bid‘at)” (Alekseev, 2013, p. 
73). To substantiate the need for such renovation and defend themselves from accusations 
of introducing the unlawful novelties, Qursawi, Yalchgul, and then Mardjani cited the well-
known Hadith: “Indeed, Allah the Almighty and the Great sends to this community at the 
beginning of each century the one who renovates the religion” (Idiyatullina, 2006, p. 270).
Mardjani’s disciples and followers believed that he not only performed ĳtihad (i.e., he 
was a mujtahid) but, moreover, performed tajdid, that is, he was the renovator of the century 
(mujaddid)8. His opponents were of a different opinion: they did not recognize Mardjani 
as a legitimate participant of the dispute, mujtahid and mujaddid, capable of deriving legal 
decisions (i.e., asserting “the truth”). To confirm that, they adduced a list of requirements 
8. Maksudi A.-Kh. described Mardjani as “a perfect mujtahid of Shariah”; “he should be considered the first mujtahid — hero 
in correcting the religious traditions and renovating the nation”; Kh.-G. Gabashi saw Mardjani as a “mujtahid and 
mujaddid (renovator)”, who renovated Islam in compliance with the Hadith: “Indeed, in the beginning of each century 
Allah will send a renovator to this community”; Atlasi also called Mardjani a renovator of the religion; T. Ilyas called him 
“a great scholar — mujtahid, explaining the truth to the people and leading along the true path,” etc. For more detail, see 
Shihabaddin Mardjani (2015, pp. 201, 323, 328, 349, 413-415). 
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which, supposedly, Mardjani did not comply with. First, they attempted to show that Mardjani 
deviated from the true ‘aqidah. Dinmuhammed wrote that Mardjani turned “to the (beliefs 
of) ‘mariqiya communities’ [apostates, renegades — D.M.] and ‘inqybaliya (reformers)’ and 
that he considered their sources to be more reliable even compared to the Quran.” Mardjani 
put those dubious works above the Quran. Dinmuhammed also compared Mardjani with 
rafidits, khawarĳs condemning the Sunnites, called him a follower of Wahhabism (al-Tuntari, 
Encouraging, pp. 13-17). Other opponents called Mardjani a Mutazilite and a philosopher 
(al-Shaulankari, 1901a, p. 10). An interesting opinion was expressed by al-Shaulyankari: 
“The authors of ‘al-wafiya’ and ‘al-hizamat,’ having buried the knowledge of pious salafs from 
Sunnah followers and their community, having preferred the madhhab of Shias, philosopher 
to the madhhab of the saved, introduced some new mujaddid of letters and novelties, 
presented the truth as the lie, and the lie as the truth” (al-Shaulankari, 1901a, p. 10). Moreover, 
al-Nasavi questioned the very existence of madhhab in Mardjani: “Maybe, he wanted to 
conceal his madhhab? Maybe he has no madhhab at all? […] The part of the citation where 
he speaks of various groups shows that the author does not belong to ahl al-Sunnah, as he 
excluded Ash‘arites from them, who are true bearers of Sunni theology” (al-Nasavi, 1874, 
p. 55). Second, the very personality of Mardjani was criticized: his knowledge and moral-
ethical qualities. Consequently, al-Nasavi concludes, Mardjani just “…wants to say that he 
reached the level of mujtahid, while, as we said above, he is a true muqallid” (al-Nasavi, 1874, 
p. 47). Another point of criticism against Mardjani was his “weak” knowledge of the Arabic 
language. al-Shaulyankari, having shown Mardjani’s “poor knowledge” of Arabic grammar, 
poses a question: “How can a person, not knowing the Arabic grammar, undertake to write 
a response to another book?” (al-Shaulankari, 1901a, p. 19). Another critic of Mardjani’s 
knowledge of Arabic was al-Nasavi, who showed that Mardjani misunderstood an Arabic 
sentence (al-Nasavi, 1874, pp. 66-67) and used words inappropriately (al-Nasavi, 1874, p. 11).
Due to the contradictions that arose between Mardjani and his opponents, Mardjani’s 
islah was rejected by his opponents. To prevent or at least reduce the carried out tajdid, 
his opponents put forward the reasons which, in their opinion, barred its implementation 
by Mardjani. First, they questioned Mardjani’s belonging to the Abu Hanifa madhhab and 
Ash‘ari-Maturidi ‘aqidah. Second, they attempted to demonstrate Mardjani’s inconsistency 
as a mujtahid, and, consequently, a renovator of religion (mujaddid). For that, they criticized 
Mardjani’s intellectual abilities, the depth of his knowledge, and his ethical and moral 
qualities.
CONCLUSION
T he research allowed the revelation of specific mechanisms of the religious tradition’s adaptation to the new living conditions of the end of the 19th century. As E. Lazzerini noted, the renovation (tajdid) taking place during that period had, indeed, rigid 
orientation, ensuring the viability and sustainability of the religious tradition (Lazzerini, 
1992). The negative changes were interpreted by scholars through the conception of deviation 
from the “straight way” and true Islam; in turn, “the truth” was introduced and established 
through renovation (tajdid) with the help of well-known Islamic methods and tools.
Reconsideration or adaptation of the religious tradition to the new conditions, as well as 
the reconsideration of the surrounding reality in the light of the primary sources, took place 
through polemic about the “straight way” and true Islam. At first the “unwanted”, obsolete 
conceptions were defined as forbidden novelties (bid‘at) on the basis of authoritative sources 
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(the Quran, the Sunnah, and ĳmaʿ); in some cases they were also defined as unbelief (kufr), 
as concepts that were absent in the first Muslim community and, consequently, carrying 
danger for Ummah. Defining the “unwanted” actions as bid‘at or kufr ensured the legitimacy 
of refusing to perform them, despite the long practice of their existence. As for the “required” 
elements, they were introduced into the tradition with the help of reform (islah), implemented 
through renovation or restoration of “the true tradition” (tajdid), allegedly existing at the 
time of the Prophet Muhammad and thus lodged with his unquestionable authority. 
While Mardjani attempted to implement islah through successive bid‘ah-tajdid, his 
opponents, on the contrary, tried to defend the tradition, giving evidence of Mardjani’s 
inconsistency as a legitimate participant of the dispute, a renovator of Islam (mujaddid) and 
mujtahid. Criticizing Mardjani for violating etiquette norms, rules of dispute and polemic, the 
opponents showed that the discussion started by Mardjani was forbidden and, consequently, 
did not lead to establishing the truth. According to them, Mardjani’s goal was not to find the 
truth but to prove his own viewpoint and cause discord and disturbance. 
The reform in the sphere of dogmatics (‘aqidah), proposed by Mardjani, complied with 
the requirements of the epoch. Starting from Catherine II and going on throughout the 
19th century, integration of Muslims into the Russian Empire implied creating a common 
economic, legislative, and historiographic space. Integration of Muslims into the common 
imperial space demanded a response at various levels. Drawing the new borders in the section 
of dogmatics (‘aqidah) and excluding the rational proofs acquired through reason (‘aql) from 
the field of tawḥīd were protective measures aimed at defending the Muslim faith under 
the Christian Empire. They allowed the protection of the religious doctrine from possible 
innovations related to introducing the interpretations welcomed by the authorities and the 
government.
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